

REGULATION THAT HOLDS THINGS BACK: THE EU AI ACT AND ITS ASYMMETRIC IMPACTS ON EDUCATIONAL CONTENT CREATORS IN THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CONTEXTS

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Abstract:

Background: Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council on artificial intelligence (hereinafter the AI Act) enters a crucial implementation phase for the education sector in August 2026. In this paper, we analyse the structural asymmetries that this regulation brings, particularly for smaller and emerging actors in the education sector in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. **Results:** We argue that compliance costs and documentation obligations, although a negligible item in the overall costs for large multinational operators of AI systems, become a prohibitive burden for micro and small players, which may significantly slow down or prevent their innovative activities. Using a case study of the educational platform Kurzologie.cz, we illustrate the specific implementation challenges faced by a Czech educational provider in 2026. **Conclusion:** We propose a complementary model in which external regulation works in conjunction with the internal ethical self-regulation of actors, with an emphasis on the proportionality of implementation requirements relative to the size and capacity of the actor. In conclusion, we formulate specific recommendations for the national implementation of the AI Act in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Keywords: EU AI Act; educational technology; regulatory compliance; cost asymmetry; ethical self-regulation; Kurzologie.cz; innovation in education

Introduction

In the summer of 2024, the AI Act was published in the Official Journal of the European Union — the first comprehensive regulatory framework for artificial intelligence at the level of European law. From 2 August 2026, its most significant section for the education sector comes into force, classifying a range of AI systems used in an educational context as high-risk and imposing extensive compliance obligations on their operators. There are therefore just under two years between the publication of the regulation and the start of its educational implementation, during which the European education sector must adapt its products, processes and documentation to the new regulatory regime.

Let us imagine a Czech educational content creator who, over the past two years, has invested their time and capital in developing a specialised platform for adult education using artificial intelligence. The platform is on the verge of being launched. The developer discovers that, as a result of the newly applied provisions of the AI Act, they must halt all production, review all content created to date, introduce new labelling systems, draw up extensive compliance documentation and, in some cases, re-evaluate the very architecture of the product. Two years' work is delayed by several months. For a large multinational company, the same obligations would constitute an administrative routine that could be absorbed within existing compliance departments. For an individual or a micro-enterprise, they represent a structural barrier.

This paper analyses the nature and consequences of this asymmetry. We do not argue against the regulation of artificial intelligence as such — the existence of a regulatory framework for such a transformative technology is legitimate and likely necessary. We argue against the specific form of regulation enshrined in the AI Act and against an implementation model that fails to adequately reflect the proportionality of the compliance burden relative to the size and capacity of the actor. Our thesis is that the AI Act, in its current form, although it has legitimate objectives of protecting fundamental rights and the safety of citizens, systematically disadvantages small and medium-sized European actors in favour of large multinational players, thereby paradoxically weakening Europe's ability to independently shape its own AI ecosystem.

The implementation of artificial intelligence within educational environments is increasingly associated not only with technological innovation, but also with broader ethical, social, and pedagogical responsibilities. Universities and educational institutions are expected to ensure that the integration of AI systems respects principles of social responsibility, transparency, and educational quality,

particularly in relation to student wellbeing and institutional accountability [10]. At the same time, contemporary educational paradigms emphasise inclusivity, equal educational opportunities, and humanistic approaches to teaching, gradually replacing older segregational models of education [1]. These principles are especially relevant in discussions surrounding AI governance and the implementation of AI-driven educational tools, where algorithmic bias or unequal access may reinforce existing inequalities. On the other hand, recent educational research also demonstrates that innovative and interactive digital learning approaches can significantly improve student motivation, engagement, and participation in the educational process [5]. Consequently, the regulatory framework surrounding AI in education should seek to balance innovation and technological advancement with ethical safeguards, inclusivity, and the protection of students' rights within the educational environment.

The aim of this text is to analyse the structural asymmetries of the AI Act with a focus on the education sector, to present a specific case study of a Czech educational content provider facing implementation challenges in 2026, and to formulate constructive proposals on how the national implementation of the AI Act in the Czech Republic and Slovakia should address these structural issues. The argument is presented in six sections. In the first section, we briefly characterise the AI Act as a European regulatory project. In the second, we analyse the position of education systems within its architecture. In the third, we develop the central thesis on the asymmetry of compliance costs. In the fourth, we present the concept of internal ethical self-regulation as a complementary model. In the fifth section, we present a case study of the Kurzologie.cz platform. In the sixth, we formulate specific implementation proposals for the Czech and Slovak contexts.

The AI Act as a European regulatory project

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council on artificial intelligence emerged after several years of legislative process in response to a number of related motivations. The first motivation was to create a unified European framework for AI systems that would replace fragmented national approaches and ensure predictability for manufacturers, operators and end-users [4]. The second was to protect citizens' fundamental rights against the potential misuse of AI systems in areas with a high impact on human life. The third was to embed European values — dignity, transparency, accountability — in the future architecture of technological development. The fourth, less formally

articulated but nonetheless present, motivation was the aim to provide Europe with a regulatory position that would distinguish the European approach from the more liberal American model and from the more explicitly state-controlled Chinese model [14].

The architecture of the AI Act is based on the principle of a risk-based approach, i.e. the gradation of the regulatory burden according to the level of risk posed by a given AI system. The Regulation distinguishes four categories. The first category comprises prohibited practices under Article 5 — social scoring systems, manipulation of vulnerable groups, and certain forms of biometric categorisation. The second category comprises high-risk systems, which are explicitly listed in Annex III and are subject to extensive compliance obligations. The third category comprises systems with limited risk, which are subject in particular to transparency obligations under Article 50. The fourth category comprises systems with minimal risk, to which only general legal standards apply.

For general-purpose AI (GPAI), i.e. language models and other systems capable of a wide range of tasks, the AI Act introduces a specific regime in Chapter V. GPAI providers must prepare technical documentation, implement a copyright compliance policy, publish a summary of training data, and, for models posing systemic risk, fulfil additional obligations including model evaluation, reporting of serious incidents, and ensuring cybersecurity. These obligations came into force at European level in August 2025 [17].

The AI Act implementation timetable is crucial for the education sector and warrants a detailed examination, which we present in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Implementation timetable of the AI Act for the education sector.

From the perspective of the education sector, the most critical date is 2 August 2026, when the regulation of high-risk AI systems classified in Annex III and, simultaneously, the transparency obligations under Article 50 come into force. From this date, all operators of AI systems in education falling into any of these categories must fully comply with the compliance obligations. The period between August 2026 and August 2027 represents a critical window during which the regulation is being fully implemented and, at the same time, the first administrative and, in some cases, legal disputes over its interpretation are taking place. The decisions that stakeholders make during this window will have long-term consequences for the nature of their operations and for their competitive position in the European market.

Training systems within the AI Act framework

The AI Act addresses education on two fundamental levels. The first level consists of the classification of selected educational AI systems as high-risk under Annex III, point 3. The second level consists of the general transparency obligations under Article 50, which apply to a wide range of AI systems, including generative models and their outputs.

Annex III, point 3 explicitly classifies the following categories of use in education as high-risk AI systems: systems designed to decide on access to or the allocation of individuals to educational institutions; systems assessing students' learning outcomes; systems designed to determine the appropriate level of education that a person receives or has access to within educational institutions, and systems designed to monitor and detect prohibited behaviour by students during testing. These systems are subject to extensive compliance obligations — the operator must establish a risk management system in accordance with Article 9, ensure the quality and representativeness of training data in accordance with Article 10, create technical documentation in accordance with Article 11, enable automatic logging in accordance with Article 12, ensure transparency and comprehensibility for users in accordance with Article 13, incorporate human oversight in accordance with Article 14, meet the requirements for accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity in accordance with Article 15, carry out a conformity assessment prior to placing on the market in accordance with Articles 43–49, and, in certain cases, register the system in the EU database of high-risk AI systems.

Article 50 of the AI Act, governing transparency obligations, imposes a duty on providers of AI systems intended for direct interaction with natural persons to design such systems in such a way that the user is clearly informed that they are interacting with AI, unless this is apparent from the context. For generative AI systems, Article 50(2) establishes an obligation to label synthetic audio, image, video or text content in such a way that it is clear that it has been artificially generated or manipulated. This obligation applies to a wide range of educational content — from text-based explanations through audio recordings to visualisations — provided that this content was created with a significant contribution from generative AI tools.

The key distinction is between the status of a provider and that of a deployer. A provider is an entity that develops an AI system, or commissions its development, and subsequently markets it under its own name. A deployer is an entity that uses an AI system as part of its business activities. Both roles entail different obligations, with those of the provider being significantly more extensive. In the context of educational platforms, this distinction has great practical significance — a platform that has developed its own AI tutor is a provider. A platform that integrates external language models from providers such as OpenAI or Anthropic is primarily a deployer, although in some situations it may assume certain obligations of a provider depending on the extent to which it adapts the system for a specific purpose [15].

The AI Act also contains provisions on supporting innovation, particularly in Chapter VI. Article 57 regulates regulatory sandboxes — environments in which small and medium-sized enterprises can test AI systems under the supervision of the relevant authorities without the full compliance burden. Article 62 sets out specific relief measures for SMEs, including priority access to sandboxes, simplified procedures and information support. These provisions are explicit in the text of the Regulation, but their practical effectiveness remains limited. By the end of 2025, sandboxes were operational in only a few Member States, and their availability to the education sector remained limited [3]. Simplified procedures for SMEs are not significant in terms of actual compliance costs — documentation requirements remain essentially the same, with only the possibility of simpler formal adjustments. For micro-actors and individuals who play a significant innovative role in the European education ecosystem, the provisions of the AI Act offer virtually no real relief.

Asymmetry of compliance costs and their structural impact

The central thesis of this article is that the compliance costs of the AI Act, whilst they may appear reasonable in absolute terms, represent a radically different burden in relative terms for actors of varying sizes and capacities. This asymmetry is not a side effect of the regulation — it is a structural feature of it, which has predictable and quantifiable economic and innovation consequences.

Estimates of compliance costs for high-risk AI systems under the AI Act vary widely in the specialist literature. A European Commission study (2021) estimated the compliance costs for a single high-risk AI system at between €6,000 and €7,000 for technical documentation alone, but also noted that total costs, including conformity assessment, monitoring and human oversight, could reach €29,000 for a small operator and considerably more for more complex systems. More recent estimates from 2024 and 2025, taking into account the actual complexity of implementation, suggest total compliance costs for a moderately complex high-risk system ranging from €100,000 to €400,000 in the first year of implementation, with recurring annual costs ranging from €50,000 to €200,000 [2; 11; 6].

These figures are negligible for a large multinational corporation — they represent a fraction of the annual budget of their compliance department. For an individual or a micro-enterprise running an educational platform as a start-up project with an annual budget in the tens of thousands of euros, the same figures either completely wipe out their financial reserves or are entirely unachievable. Between these two extremes lies a broad spectrum of small and medium-sized actors, for whom compliance represents varying degrees of burden, but generally has a deterrent effect on investment in innovation.

We illustrate this structural asymmetry in Figure 2, which depicts the general relationship between an actor's size, available resources and relative compliance burden.




Figure 2. Asymmetry of compliance costs under the AI Act.

Figure 2 illustrates what is often referred to in the economic literature as the regulatory scaling problem [13]. Regulatory costs are not primarily a function of a firm’s size — documenting a high-risk AI system requires the same amount of work regardless of whether it is carried out by a global corporation or a five-person start-up. Available resources, by contrast, scale exponentially with the size of the firm. The consequence is that there is a certain threshold of size below which compliance becomes prohibitive — consuming a disproportionate share of resources or being entirely unachievable. Actors above this threshold perceive the same regulation as an administrative routine. Actors below this threshold face it as an existential barrier [8].

This structural logic gives rise to three practical consequences that are particularly problematic for the European AI ecosystem. The first is the deterrence effect — potential European innovators in the education sector often do not even start their projects because they anticipate an unbearable compliance burden. The second is the migration effect — existing projects are relocating their operations and headquarters outside the European Union, for example to the UK, Switzerland or the US, where the regulatory environment is more favourable to smaller players. The third, and perhaps most serious, is the consolidation effect — the sector is concentrating in the hands of a few large players who can afford compliance, whilst smaller players are either squeezed out or absorbed.

Paradoxically, this effect contradicts one of the stated goals of the European Digital Strategy, which is to support European AI sovereignty through the development of a strong domestic ecosystem [12].

Let us emphasise that this criticism does not imply a rejection of regulation as such. It merely means that the specific design of the AI Act overestimates ex ante preventive protection and underestimates the impacts on the innovative dynamics of the European market. Alternative regulatory models that operate on the basis of proportionality, taking into account the actual size of the actor and the current impact of the system (rather than a ‘ ’ of theoretical category risk), could address the legitimate protective objectives of the AI Act with significantly lower asymmetric impacts.

Internal ethical self-regulation as a complementary model

Ex ante prescriptive regulation is not the only way to ensure the responsible development and deployment of AI systems. Alongside external regulation, a second mechanism exists and functions — internal ethical self-regulation by actors, based on internal values, professional standards and organisational cultures. This mechanism is systematically underestimated in the debate on the AI Act, although in practice it often leads to more robust ethical decisions than external compliance.

An illustrative example in 2024 and 2025 was the differing approaches of two leading American AI laboratories. Anthropic, founded on the concept of Constitutional AI and internally formulated principles of responsible development, has long presented stronger internal ethical frameworks and publicly declared its willingness to reject certain uses of its models. Its cooperation with military and security actors was deliberately limited to non-combat applications, with explicit restrictions on lethal autonomous weapons. OpenAI, by contrast, has adopted a broader framework for cooperation with government actors, including contractual relationships with the US Pentagon since early 2024, and its internal ethical restrictions have been less clearly articulated in its communications. This contrast does not illustrate a simple hierarchy between ethical and unethical actors — both companies operate within a complex institutional environment and their decisions are the result of many factors. It does, however, illustrate that significant decisions regarding AI applications take place primarily at the internal level of organisational values and culture, rather than primarily at the level of external regulation [7].

This fact has an important implication for our argument. External regulation of the AI Act type assumes that, without legislative pressure, actors will not make responsible ethical decisions. The practice of leading AI laboratories shows that this assumption is partly incorrect — the strongest ethical constraints in the AI sector arise from internal initiatives, not from external pressure. Regulation has its place in catching out actors who lack internal ethical frameworks or circumvent them, but it would not be the primary mechanism for ethical behaviour.

Here, however, a subtle distinction must be acknowledged. A company's ethical maturity is a function of its size, maturity and position within the ecosystem. In the case of a global technology leader with a billion-dollar valuation, thousands of employees and a prominent position in public debate, it is reasonable to expect a developed internal ethics framework with documented decision-making processes, an independent ethics committee and transparent communication. Such a company has both the capacity and the responsibility to bear the full weight of internal regulation. One cannot expect the same degree of institutionalisation from a start-up or a micro-actor — internal regulation takes place predominantly at the level of the founder's personal ethics, collaboration with a small team, and ad hoc decisions based on specific situations. This does not mean that a start-up has no ethical responsibility. It means that regulatory expectations of it must be proportionate to its actual capacity [16].

A combination of external regulation and internal ethical self-regulation only makes sense if this proportionality is respected. A regulatory framework that imposes equally extensive compliance obligations on both a global corporation and a micro-educational project ultimately favours the corporation — for the corporation, these obligations are a manageable routine; for the micro-project, they are an existential threat. A reformed architecture that respects proportionality according to the size of the actor and explicitly recognises documented internal ethical self-regulation as equivalent to certain external compliance obligations would address legitimate protective objectives at a significantly lower cost to innovation.

A concrete proposal that would operationalise this complementary model is a two-tier structure. The first tier consists of universal basic obligations — the transparency obligations of Article 50, the prohibition of explicitly banned practices, and the general obligation of human oversight in systems with significant impact. These obligations apply to all actors regardless of size. The second layer consists of extended compliance obligations for high-risk systems, but with proportionality based on the actor's size. A small actor would document

its internal ethical self-regulation — clearly articulated values, decision-making processes, and mechanisms for reflection — as an equivalent to part of the formal compliance obligations. A large actor would fulfil all formal compliance obligations in full. This two-tier structure preserves the legitimate protective objectives of the AI Act whilst removing structural barriers for small European innovators [9].

Case study: Kurzologie.cz in 2026

To illustrate the structural impacts of the AI Act on a small European education provider, we present the case of the Kurzologie.cz platform, operated by one of the authors of this article within the Czech education sector. The platform focuses on professional development for adults in the field of creating online courses using artificial intelligence. After two years of development, it is in the final stages of preparation for market launch and, at the same time, facing key implementation decisions related to the AI Act.

From the perspective of the AI Act, Kurzologie.cz is an example of a hybrid actor. In some respects, it functions as a provider – it has developed its own design frameworks, proprietary curriculum structure and specific pedagogical tools. In other respects, it acts as a deployer — integrating external language models from several providers for functions such as an AI tutor, a content creation assistant, or a tool for student exercises. This hybrid nature is typical of current European educational platforms, and the AI Act does not address it with sufficient nuance.

Two areas of compliance obligations are particularly relevant for the platform in 2026. The first area concerns transparency obligations under Article 50. Over two years of development, a significant volume of the platform's text, audio and video content has been created with substantial input from generative AI tools — as conceptual assistance, as a basis for further authorial development, and in some cases as a direct output followed by authorial revision. From August 2026, all content created in this way must bear a visible label informing users of its partially AI-generated origin. In practice, this means reviewing the entire production, introducing a systematic labelling system, adding metadata to audio and video files, and in some cases even reworking segments of content where the label would disrupt the educational function. According to our estimates, this review requires several months of concentrated work, during which no further production of new content can take place. For a small player in the critical phase prior to market launch, this loss of time has a significant impact on the overall strategy.

The second area critical to the platform's planned future development is the potential classification of certain planned features as high-risk under Annex III, point 3. If the platform wishes to deploy adaptive learning pathways, automatic assessment of student outcomes, or personalisation systems responding to individual progress in the future, some of these features may fall into the high-risk categories, regardless of whether they are technically implemented via the platform's own model or through the integration of an external API. In such a case, the operator would have to fulfil all obligations under Articles 9–15 of the AI Act — risk management system, data quality, technical documentation, logging, transparency, human oversight, accuracy and robustness requirements — plus conformity assessment and possible registration in the EU database. For a platform of the size of Kurzologie.cz, such obligations would represent a completely unsustainable compliance burden — the estimated costs, running into hundreds of thousands of euros per year, would exceed the platform's entire operating budget.

This situation has a pragmatic consequence faced by quite a few small European educational content creators. The future development of the platform must be designed to avoid being classified as high-risk, even though some interesting pedagogical possibilities fall precisely into this ' ' category. The platform must consider whether to implement adaptive personalisation, which would be pedagogically beneficial for students, at the cost of moving into the high-risk category and the associated compliance burden. In many cases, it will be a more rational decision not to implement the innovation, or to implement it in a limited form that avoids the high-risk classification. Paradoxically, regulation thus discourages precisely those innovations which, if properly designed, could benefit students.

The case of Kurzologie.cz is not unique — it is emblematic. In 2026, dozens to hundreds of Czech and Slovak educational content creators are grappling with similar dilemmas, as are thousands of similar stakeholders in other European Union member states. The sum of their individual rational decisions — to implement a stripped-down version, migrate outside the EU, suspend further development, or avoid certain categories of features — produces an effect at the macro level that runs counter to the stated goals of the European Digital Strategy. The European educational ecosystem is losing its ability to compete with American and Asian platforms in the field of AI-supported education, which in the long term threatens European educational sovereignty [18].

Proposals for the national implementation of the AI Act in Czech Republic and Slovakia

The European regulation does not allow nation states to avoid implementing the AI Act, but it gives them significant flexibility in how specifically to implement the regulation and how to support their domestic stakeholders in managing the compliance burden. In this section, we formulate six specific proposals for Czech and Slovak implementation that would address the structural issues analysed in the previous sections.

The first proposal concerns the establishment of functional regulatory sandboxes for educational AI systems. Czech and Slovak implementing legislation should include a specific mechanism for establishing a sandbox specialising in educational technologies, which would enable smaller stakeholders to test innovative AI systems under the expert supervision of national authorities without the full compliance burden. The sandbox should be genuinely accessible — not merely established in name only — and its capacity should correspond to the size of the domestic market for educational content creators. Experience from the Netherlands, Spain and Norway, where sandboxes have been operating on a limited basis since 2024, shows that their effectiveness depends primarily on the supervisory authority's staffing capacity and on practical user accessibility.

The second proposal concerns the establishment of a national centre of expertise for the AI Act in education. Such a centre would provide practical assistance to small players in interpreting the regulation, in classifying their systems, in preparing technical documentation, and in carrying out conformity assessments. The centre should function as a shared infrastructure — expensive compliance expertise, which individual micro-actors cannot afford, would be made available under a subsidised scheme. In certain areas of regulation where there is a clear precedent, the centre could also offer documentation templates and reference implementations, which actors could adapt for their specific systems.

The third proposal concerns the operationalisation of proportionality according to the size of the actor. The Czech and Slovak implementation should explicitly set out how to apply in practice the provisions of the AI Act on SMEs (Article 62) and on the proportionality of compliance requirements. Specifically, they should establish different implementation timetables, different documentation formats, and different fees for conformity assessment according to the category

of actor. Micro-actors and individuals should be granted a special regime that reflects their actual capacity — not merely formal exemptions, but a genuinely functional mechanism that enables them to comply without undermining their economic viability.

The fourth proposal concerns the recognition of internal ethical self-regulation as an equivalent mechanism in certain compliance areas. Actors who have documented internal ethical self-regulation — an explicit values framework, decision-making processes, reflection mechanisms, and public commitments — should be given the option to replace certain external compliance requirements with this internal documentation. This approach would reward actors who take ethical responsibility seriously, whilst reducing their formal compliance burden. Implementation could be based on existing ISO/IEC 42001 models, but with greater flexibility for smaller actors.

The fifth proposal concerns the financing of compliance for smaller actors. The European Recovery Fund and national budgets should include a specific allocation to support compliance for small and medium-sized education providers. This fund would finance both centralised infrastructure (competence centres, sandboxes, shared documentation templates) and individual support (grants for conformity assessment, subsidised legal expertise, compensation for documentation costs). Without such support, the AI Act will, in practice, be a regulation that large players comply with, whilst small players either circumvent it or leave the European market as a result.

The sixth proposal concerns the ongoing assessment of the regulation's impact on the domestic ecosystem. The Czech and Slovak implementation should include an explicit monitoring mechanism to track how the AI Act affects the education market, which actors it displaces, where innovative activity is shifting, and what unintended consequences the regulation brings. This data should be publicly available and should serve as a basis for reviewing the implementation if it turns out that the structural impacts on the domestic ecosystem are more severe than anticipated when the regulation was adopted.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have analysed the structural asymmetries of the EU AI Act with a focus on the education sector in the Czech and Slovak contexts. We have argued that the regulation, whilst having legitimate protective objectives, in its current form systematically disadvantages smaller European actors in favour of large multinational players. Compliance costs, which are an administrative

routine for corporations, become a prohibitive barrier for micro-actors. Using the case study of the Kurzologie.cz platform, we illustrated how specific implementation obligations affect a small Czech educational content creator preparing to launch its platform on the market. We have formulated a concept for a complementary model in which external regulation works in conjunction with the internal ethical self-regulation of actors, and proposed six specific measures for the national implementation of the AI Act in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Our position is not anti-regulatory. We recognise that the rapid development of artificial intelligence poses real risks to citizens' fundamental rights and to social institutions, and that a certain regulatory framework is legitimate and likely necessary. Our criticism is directed at the specific design of the AI Act, which overemphasises *ex ante* prescriptive protection, underestimates the proportionality of compliance relative to the size of the actor, and fails to sufficiently value internal ethical self-regulation as a complementary mechanism. This design is neither natural nor necessary — it arose from the specific political and institutional dynamics of European legislation between 2021 and 2024. A revision of this design within the framework of national implementation, and in the longer term also within the framework of the European review of the AI Act planned for 2028, is politically feasible, intellectually legitimate, and economically desirable.

In conclusion, we would like to offer one reflection with a broader perspective. Artificial intelligence represents a historically rare moment when the productive power of a significant transformative technology is decentralised and becomes accessible to individuals and small teams. A creator with a laptop and access to a few language models can now produce educational content that, just five years ago, required capital and a team of a much larger scale. This decentralisation is exceptional in modern economic history and represents an opportunity for European players who may have lagged behind American and Asian giants in previous industrial technology waves. Paradoxically, the AI Act in its current form neutralises this opportunity for decentralisation — the compliance burden shifts the competitive advantage back to large, capital-rich players. The Czech and Slovak implementation of the AI Act has a real opportunity to mitigate this paradoxical situation and create a domestic ecosystem in which small European creators can thrive. Seizing this opportunity is both politically and economically rational. This article is an invitation to discuss how best to make use of it.

The author explores further aspects of the implementation of the AI Act in education and the evolving role of regulation in the age of artificial intelligence in forthcoming studies currently in preparation.

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